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Abstract
Public key cryptography has become very popular recently. To use it securely, it is necessary to employ
systems offering at least a basic set of functions associated with public key cryptosystems containing gen-
eration of keys, secure generation of certificates, verification of signatures, dissemination of revoked certifi-
cates, and so on. This paper demonstrates that the use of public key cryptography is not easy and it is very
difficult to perform the above-mentioned actions in a way satisfying some predefined security level. The
reason is in the complexity of the problem. We are not generally able to ensure the usage of systems able to
work with all existing algorithms, key lengths, and formats in the whole public key infrastructure. Also,
some people are of the opinion that X.509 as a basis for PKI is obsolete.
Keywords: PKI, X.509, hierarchy, CRL.
1.  Introduction
Public cryptography is attracting much attention through various kinds of implementation of public key
infrastructures (PKI). This popularity has lead, in the Czech Republic, to the adoption of the Electronic
Signature Law. The problem is that public key cryptography is hard to understand without basic knowledge
of its mathematical background and a general security model. This paucity of knowledge results in public
displays by uneducated persons, during witch they introduce basic concepts of the technology but ignore
fundamental security risks that make usage of the technology vulnerable and dangerous for its users. The
goal of this paper is to highlight problems that are not so obvious but force experts to think over the basic
concepts and its possible modifications.
1.1  Current problem areas
During  the  time  we  were  working  with  the  X.509-based  standard,  some  flaws  and  problems  gradually
appeared. The problems were associated mostly with the technology. As the project advanced, new prob-
lems related to administration appeared. In short, three basic problem areas related to the PKI have been
identified.
•   Technology – the problems related to the principles on which the whole idea of PKI is based.
•   Administration – the problems resulting from application of the technology.
•   General security –application of the technology seemed to violate some basic security requirements.
Most of the negatives are related to the complexity of the PKI implementations. While attending any secu-
rity course, you are told that public cryptography is very useful for exchanging secrets necessary for private
communication satisfying privacy. This statement is true, but only if you know with whom you are commu-
nicating. At the moment you try to build versatile system (identification of users is the hardest problem), it
becomes apparent that the problems to be solved are comparable (because of their complexity) to applica-
tions of symmetric cryptography.- 40 -
Let us assume the basic concept of the X.500 family of standards – a global hierarchy of domain names. The
impossibility of reaching this goal has been one of major reasons that defeated X.400 as an e-mail standard.
One could say that changes in the premises imply at least rethinking the model built on them, but it has
never taken a place.
1.2  Solutions
Are there any easy solutions that would solve problems associated with the standard? It does not seem so.
People are being assured by vendors and security consultants that today’s PKI solutions solve all their secu-
rity problems and needs. We are told that PKIs may be used everywhere and by anyone.
The opposite is proved by new emerging technologies, based on different assumptions and promising solu-
tions to some problems of X.509 technology. However, any new system has to be compatible with the
existing one because of interoperability. It is a difficult problem to introduce packages preserving communi-
cation with existing public key infrastructures while offering new technology. An ideal security product
cannot be seen by users, and it is hard to understand and even harder to explain why the new solution is
better when nothing can be seen on the display.
The rest of this paper consists of three chapters devoted to the problem areas already introduced. One chap-
ter also describes some other approaches and technologies.
2.  Technology
The basic problem of the technology is the need for trusted third parties, but there is no solution. The sec-
ond-worst problem is the distribution of information about revoked certificates.
The traditional method to distribute certificate-status information involves a certification authority (CA)
periodically issuing a CRL that is posted to repositories. Each CRL includes all revoked and still unexpired
certificates issued by the CA. One of the pieces of information included is the nextUpdate field, which
specifies the time the next CRL will be issued. It is clear that the size of the CRL may be very large,
depending on the number of certificates issued, the environment, and the period of the certificates’ validity
and users’ activity. The paper by David A. Cooper [1] examines the load on the repository. His work deter-
mines the peak of load as being on about 35 requests per second for 300.000 relying parties and 24 hour-
validity of CRL. I consider it an unacceptable number regarding the size of CRL at about 10 kB and a con-
nection through a line of 100 kb/s.
The rate of CRL requests has an exponential probability and allows one to offer some solutions to make the
rate more balanced.
Over-issued CRLs solve the problem that CRL cached by relying parties expires at one moment. This
method spreads out requests for CRLs by ensuring that cached information expires at the same time only for
a part of the relying parties. The way it is done is simple – there are several updates of CRL during their
validity. For example, 24 hour-validity CRLs are generated every three hours. It means that ideally only one
eighth of the relying parties need to update their copy of CRL at the same moment.
Segmented CRLs solve the problem by dividing certificate owners into smaller groups. Each group is then
assigned to its own CRLs. This decreases sizes of revocation lists, and frees communication channels a bit
and decreases response time of the repositories. The reverse side of the solution is that relying parties
probably need to download more CRLs.
On-line status protocols spread the requests steadily over time but bring in more communication sessions.
With ten verifications per day (assumed so far) it makes nearly 35 requests per second (300,000 relying par-
ties) and does not solve the problem at all. Furthermore, it decreases the security of the system as a whole,
because the private key of the CA has to be used automatically (it is not possible to have a human operating
35 requests per second throughout the day).- 41 -
The calculations introduced so far suppose that the frequency of verification of digital signatures is uniform
over time. It is not, however, true in the real life. An average clerk starts his or her computer at 8:00AM, and
the first application to appear is an e-mail client. It means the repository needs to answer many more
requests at one moment (assuming the new CRL is published sometime between 4:00PM and 8:00AM).
There are also other problems we have not mentioned that are connected with the proposed solutions. Over-
issuing of revocation lists means that one certificate appears in each CRL at a different time, and it takes
time for the CRLs’ validity to appear everywhere. This raises two questions. Is the signature valid when
identification of the appropriate certificate appears in for example, three CRLs but does not appear in five
others? Who is responsible for the possible losses?
The segmented CRL is a good idea (especially for CAs because it allows keeping size of the revocation lists
small, which is very useful for implementation), but we need to identify the correct CRL, and it adds a re-
quirement to signature-verification process.
We have not mentioned the usage of delta-CRL that is directly defined in X.509. When using this method,
complete CRLs are issued periodically and, meanwhile, only changes in the given CRL are issued and
distributed. The target is similar to the segmented CRLs. We want to reduce communication costs. The
reverse side of this method is the necessity to check the base and all newer delta CRLs during the verifica-
tion process by the relying party. It looks satisfactory now, but there is a problem. There has be a restriction
on the length of the delta-CRLs chain to verify. When the limit is reached, all the relying parties need to
obtain a new base CRL. You can see that it does not result in any improvement.
A modification sliding window delta-CRL has been proposed [2]. It is a combination of the delta-CRL
principle and over-issuing. A new base CRL is then generated with each delta CRL. The advantages com-
bine results of over-issuing (decreased rate) and delta-CRL (decreased size of transmitted data). But the
complexity of the system to issue CRLs makes this a costly option.
Speaking of technology, there is another critical difficulty. The secure usage of asymmetric cryptography
requires the usage of secure hardware – at least smart cards – that is able to perform cryptographic opera-
tions. The problem is that this cryptography is rather complicated and requirements on smart cards are there-
fore quite demanding. There are not many vendors offering such crypto cards, and their price is relatively
high. The complexity is due to two reasons: the complexity of the mathematics itself and verification of the
certification path. The second function becomes problematic with high certification trees.
3.  Administration
Real implementation of PKI also causes problems associated with administration of all the parts of the sys-
tem. What we see certification policies as being very problematic. Standard X.509v3 [3] has made it possi-
ble to define the particular policy used for issuing certificates and to insert information about that policy into
each certificate.
There is a good reason for the idea. It is possible to discern certificates according to their quality. The re-
verse side of that is the implementation of the idea.
•   It is necessary to express policy used for the certificate.
•   When verifying the certificate, we have to monitor fulfillment of some quality requirements.
•   There is no common root, and we have to define rules to be able to apply certificates from different
CAs.
The X.509v3 standard allows the expression of policy-mapping rules in certificates, but it also makes it
more complex to use them securely. To make the situation even more complex, there is also a concept for an
attribute certificate that is being greatly extended in version 4 of the standard [4].
To solve the problem of cooperation among several certification domains is the main objective of Federal
Bridge Certification Authority Initiative [5]. One of the basic terms defined ”trust domain”,  is a portion of
the Federal PKI (FPKI) operating under the management of one policy-management body. An FPKI policy
authority that governs collaboration on how best to ensure interoperation of existing agencies has also been- 42 -
formed. The result of this effort is the Federal Bridge Certification Authority. FPKIPA approves Certifica-
tion Practice Statement (CPS) for the FBCA and determines the assurance levels at which agency principal
CAs may interoperate through the FBCA. To determine the assurance level, it is necessary to compare certi-
fication policies, CPSs, and other submitted materials (really nothing for a smart card).
FBCA acts as a bridge among agencies’ principal (root) CAs by issuing cross-certificates with them. The
cross-certificates  contain  mapping  of  certification  policies.  The  verification  of  the  certificate  issued  in
another trusted domain is done by verification of the whole certification path up to the principal CA of that
trusted domain. The second step is transformation of policies expressed in the certificate by policy-mapping
rules. We have not mentioned checking of lists of revoked certificates, which also has to be done. Progress
is being made, but it is not easy.
We are using the notion of a trusted third party (TTP), but we have not mentioned what the word trusted
means. Well, that is because it is very difficult. It is even more difficult when the TTP (for example TTP1)
has to trust some other TTP2. TTP2 is not as trusted as TTP1, but is it trustworthy more or less? And how
much more or less trustworthy is it?
There are some general answers designed for the purpose. We mean standards for evaluation of computer
security [6, 7, 8]. The problem is that there are too few subjects able to really evaluate the security of com-
plex information systems, and CA is a complex system. The Czech electronic signature law solves the
problem with the statement ability to by certified.
Another aspect comprises registration processes. This is one of the most important parts of the PKI activi-
ties.  The  quality  of  the  registration  process  determines  trust  in  the  PKI  as  a  whole.  The  organizations
running CAs are able to ensure security of CA’s secret keys by secure hardware tokens, locks, and electronic
security systems, but it is impossible (for organizational, financial and technical reasons) to ensure the same
level of trust for registration authorities’ (RA) secret keys. It means that it is very difficult to attack PKI as
a whole, but it is much less difficult to attack one half, one fifth, or one tenth of the system, depending on
the number of RAs attacked.
Our last remarks are about revocation. It seems that requirements on certificate revocations are strongly
connected to the purpose (application) of the certificate used. This is implied by the fact that there is not
generally a secure method for revocation. There are two extremes: frequent revocation and secure usage of
secret keys needed for revocation. We always have to make some kind of compromise. We do not discuss
the realistic probability that users are able to discover abuse of their secret keys, although they are fully
responsible for them.
4.  General Security
What we are going to discuss in this chapter is a more general conception of security related to PKI. We
want to depict the impact of PKI on privacy [9]. We may talk about secret and private keys.
•   Secret key generation – must be performed entirely under the holder’s control but also in a certifiably
secure manner. We have to ensure that the secret key is never outside the possession of the holder.
•   Secret key storage and backup – has to be secure to ensure uninterrupted possession by the holder.
•   Secret key escrow – is contradictory to the very concept of PKI.
•   Secret key access – by the holder has to be uninterrupted (as stated by the law). Therefore it should be
exempt from court orders and search warrants.
•   Certification identification requirements – may involve intrusive demands for documents and possibly
biometrics, perhaps exceeding the needs of the police.
•   Registers of public keys and/or certificates – are necessarily public (according to Czech law). It is
important to realize that they create a serious risk for the certificates’ owners as a multi-purpose identi-
fication database.- 43 -
The root of most problems is the tendency to preserve absolute identification, which is common in real
world but does not take into account the increased risks associated with full identification in cyber space.
The result of this position may lead to the death of private space.
The main benefit spoken of in the media is the possibility of easy communication between citizens and the
state apparatus. Only a few know that an electronic signature, as defined by the law, may serve only as an
instrument to secure communication, but cannot be used as a mechanism for proving the originator of stored
documents. One may sign a tax return and a minute after that may revoke its certificate. I would not want to
be the judge resolving a dispute about whether the certificate holder and alleged signer signed it or not. You
may say that most people would not even be aware of that possibility, but there are a small number of people
who could find flaws in the system.
We have included ten, slightly changed, risks of PKI identified by Schneier and Ellison [10] at the end of the
chapter. The article states ten questions that may be very interesting to answer before applying PKI by your
organization but also if you are already using it.
Whom do we trust, and for what?
Who is using my secret key?
How secure is the verifying computer?
I know the name, but who is it?
Is the CA an authority?
Do you know, what information you certify?
Is Registration Authority as secure as CA?
How did the CA identify the certificate holder?
How secure are the certificate practices?
Why are we using the CA process, anyway?
5.  Alternatives
We do not want to say that there is a general alternative to PKI, just as we do not say that PKI is generally
useful. First, someone should consider what the requirements on the system are. Such a statement should be
then used for deciding on devices that are able to satisfy them.
A very good example is in banking. There is a bank that has realized that the most important task is authen-
tication of clients and that the relation is 1:n. All clients are to communicate with just one subject – the
bank. With this in mind, they have decided to use authentication calculators that keep the system simple,
from both the customer’s point of view and the bank’s. Another bank has decided on PKI. It resulted in
a more complicated system not only for the bank itself but also for its customers. One has to visit the bank
twice. The first time one obtains software necessary for the generation of keys, and the second time (with
3½” disk) the certificate is generated. The first bank uses just symmetric cryptography; the second bank has
to use both the symmetric and asymmetric (public key) types.
The opposite alternative to PKI is symmetric cryptography. To secure communication with a one-time pad
(it offers perfect secrecy), it is necessary to use 1 CD for 650 MB of data, and it is largely data for corre-
spondence. It is the simplest and the most secure way to ensure secure communication among a few of peo-
ple. One may also use the CD as a source of encryption keys. When changing the key (128 bits) twice a day,
one may do it, for 50,000 years. (This is only a theoretical computation.)
5.1  PGP
Pretty Good Privacy uses the concept web of trust instead of hierarchy, which is used by X.509. This system
does not use any trusted third party, but each user issues its own certificate. When you want to communicate
with a friend, you simply give him your certificate in as secure a way, as you believe necessary. Users of the
system must be aware of the security risks, and the resulting security is fully in their hands.
By the way, is it a bad idea to print a fingerprint of the public key on business cards?- 44 -
5.2  SPKI/SDSI
There are two concepts; these are Simple Public Key Infrastructure and Simple Distributed Security Infra-
structure, which are being harmonized [12, 13]. SDSI has introduced the concept of local names. The basic
idea is that it is useless to have globally unique name beyond what we know and use as everyday local
names. We know many people only by their first name; perhaps we know their whole name, but how many
of your friends do you know by their address? When one says ”Peter”, he knows who it is. There is also
a significant difference from X.509, in that it is possible to use names for groups of persons. Each member
of the groups has his or her own keys, but the name is the same.
X.509 based systems use CRLs as the mechanism to distribute information about revoked certificates. SPKI
knows three types of validity tests: CRL, re-validation, and one-time. The original CRL was modeled on
print books used as blacklists for account numbers and credit card numbers. However, there may be prob-
lems with timing when it is not possible to obtain a new CRL, and some attacks may be based on the fact.
The positive version of CRL (revalidation) contains one or more certificates valid for another interval. The
third possibility is an on-line check of the certificate’s validity. This is similar to the OCSP protocol defined
for X.509 certificates.
It is also very important to use very simple syntax for certificates and other data, so that no special and com-
plicated parsers are needed. This prevents much of the complexity of the resulting software solutions. In
fact, BNF is used for definition of SPKI certificates.
5.3  Private Credentials
Stefan Brand has proposed a different conception of digital certificates. They are called private credentials
and their validity can be checked without revealing the identity of their holder. They also protect certificate
holders from linking separate actions [14].
The prime goal of private credentials is to preserve the privacy of their holders. The holders are the subjects
that decide what information is to be disclosed to the recipient. Although the certificate may contain a set of
attributes, the holder may choose a subset of them to be accessible by the verifier of the certificate.
6.  Conclusions
PKI solutions are enthusiastically advertised by a number of vendors. The most important reason is money.
One has to create the infrastructure, but the process of issuing a certificate costs nearly nothing and each
customer needs to ask for at least one certificate a year, on a regular base.
PKI as understood today is a solution for environments where identification is needed. Its usage for commu-
nication between a citizen and a civil servant is understandable, but the necessity to have a list of certificates
publicly available is not good news for certificates holders’ privacy. Moreover identification of the holder of
the certificate has to be unique.
Most people do not realize that secure usage of public key cryptography is not just about strong cryptog-
raphy and secure algorithms. The system is much more complicated and includes secure viewer-to-display
information that is to be signed, a secure environment for storing and using private keys (usually secure
hardware), and signature verification that must be done in a secure environment because it is as important as
signing. When hearing statements like ”a digital signature is 99.9999999% secure”, one has to reassure that
it is the security expert’s word for it. The security of the signature is only as secure as the lock on your door
or smart card in your pocket. The security of a system is as good as the weakest part of the system.
There are many ways to secure communication and to ensure authentication and privacy. It is foolhardy to
say that a particular solution is suitable for all situations and all environments. When you ask an expert and
he claims to have a universal solution, it is better that you find another expert.
“Real security is hard work. There is no cure-all, especially not PKI” [11].- 45 -
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Abstract
There are numerous types of equipment for cryptographic protection of information. This paper discusses
reason  for  implementing  a  national  cryptographic  environment,  and  the  accompanying,  challenges  and
opportunities. Implementation of NCE is a strategic matter for all countries but for small ones it is very
difficult to be self-sufficient.
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1.  Introduction
One of the basic tasks of the Cryptographic Security Branch of the Military Security Office in Prague is to
implement of the national cryptographic environment (NCE) in computer, information, and communication
systems requiring cryptographic information protection.
NCE is a system of unique cryptographic methods and tools developed by a state administration authority to
be  used  primarily  within  its  own  organization,  possibly  within  the  state  administration  of  a  respective
country.
NCE is implemented mainly within the systems handling classified information to provide their crypto-
graphic protection. This entails the protection of information transmitted by telephone, fax and radio as well
as of information transmitted within information and communication systems at different layers of an OSI
model (application, network, link) for various transmission technologies and protocols (TCP/IP, HDLC,
X.25, ATM, ISDN, G.703, etc.) and for the cryptographic protection of the information processed and stored
directly in computers. The above list shows the need for a very wide spectrum of national cryptographic
algorithms and equipment, and therefore the national cryptographic environment is utilized primarily by
economically and technologically developed subjects.
2.  Motivation for implementation of NCE
At present, cryptography is becoming a public affair, the computer capabilities of particular subjects are
increasing (either by using new and more capable or original, but significantly cheaper, technologies or by
utilizing computer capacities of large networks – mainly the Internet). This increases the number of quali-
fied  attackers  (students  –  hackers,  virus  creators,  foreign  intelligence,  and  international  terrorist  and
extremist groups) as well as the motivations for attack (individual prestige, industrial espionage, and eco-
nomic crime). Besides the visible attempts to paralyze the functioning of information and communication
systems, it is possible to conduct hidden long-term attacks against confidentiality, integrity and authenticity